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Why the Supreme Court Should Give 
the Easy Answer to an Easy Question: 
A Response to Professors Childress, 
Neuborne, Sherry and Silberman 
Howard M. Erichson* 
None of us thinks that the Supreme Court should affirm the 
Ninth Circuit?s ruling that California had general jurisdiction over 
DaimlerChrysler. But we differ on the extent to which we think the 
Supreme Court should use DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman1 to clarify 
the law of personal jurisdiction, rather than sidestep the core questions. 
And if the Justices are to speak on general jurisdiction, we differ on 
exactly what we think they ought to say. 
Professors Burt Neuborne and Suzanna Sherry would have the 
Court duck the issue on which it granted certiorari, but in different 
ways. Professor Neuborne thinks the Court should dismiss the appeal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 Professor Sherry, while not 
asking the Court to dismiss and not necessarily asking the Court to shy 
away from personal jurisdiction questions altogether, urges the court to 
avoid the particular issue of whether jurisdiction can rest on the 
imputed contacts of a corporate subsidiary.3 
In contrast to Professors Sherry and Neuborne, I hope the 
Supreme Court will address head-­on the personal jurisdiction issues.4 
 
 * Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
 1.  644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013). 
 2.  Burt Neuborne, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, 66 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 95, 97?99 (2013). 
 3.  Suzanna Sherry, ?????????????????????y (and How) the Supreme Court Should Duck 
the Issue in DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 111, 114?16 (2013). 
 4.  The Court does not lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case. Even if the 
???????????????????????????????????????? undermined by Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 
S. Ct. 1659 (2013) and Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012), the federal courts 
continue to have supplemental jurisdiction over the non-­federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) 
(granting supplemental jurisdiction);; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (giving district court discretion to 
dismiss supplemental claims if all federal claims have been dismissed). 
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Even after the Court?s unanimous decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations v. Brown,5 too much confusion remains concerning the 
standard for general jurisdiction over corporations.6 Little is gained by 
keeping lawyers and judges in the dark about jurisdictional limits 
(except, perhaps, for the lawyers who litigate these issues and the 
academics who write about them). The DaimlerChrysler case offers an 
opportunity to shed some light. The issues that need to be addressed, 
frankly, are not that complicated. 
The heart of the DaimlerChrysler appeal may be resolved with 
the following two questions and answers, neither of which should be 
terribly controversial after Goodyear. First, what state or states possess 
plenary power over a defendant so that the state may exercise 
adjudicatory authority without regard to where claims arose? The 
obvious answer is the defendant?s home state. For an individual, the 
home state is the person?s state of domicile;; for a corporation, it is the 
corporation?s state of incorporation and its principal place of business.7 
Second, if a defendant is neither incorporated in the forum state nor 
maintains its principal place of business there, may a state nonetheless 
be considered the defendant?s ?home state? for purposes of general 
jurisdiction because of the activities of the defendant?s subsidiary acting 
as an agent? As I argued in my initial piece, this second question should 
be answered in the negative.8 
The Supreme Court sometimes faces situations in which it is 
wise to avoid a hard issue because the particular case does not tee up 
the issue well enough, but DaimlerChrysler is not such a case. The basic 
question that the Court needs to address is what the Court meant in its 
Goodyear decision concerning the permissible scope of general 
jurisdiction over corporations.9 If I am correct that Goodyear 
established a home-­state test for general jurisdiction, and that home 
state means state of incorporation or principal place of business, then 
 
 5.  131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 6.  See Sherry, supra note 3, at 118?19 & n.32 and cases cited therein. 
 7.  In general, a corporation has one principal place of business. As two of us have noted in 
this Roundtable, circumstances may justify finding more than one principal place of business for 
purposes of general jurisdiction, such as when a corporation maintains dual headquarters or when 
its headquarters are separated from its primary operations. See Howard M. Erichson, The Home-­
State Test for General Personal Jurisdiction, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 81, 86?87 (2013);; Sherry, 
supra note 3, at 118 n.31. 
 8.  See Erichson, supra note 7, at 91-­92. 
 9.  In this regard, DaimlerChrysler differs from J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 
S. Ct. 2780 (2011). In Nicastro, Justices Breyer and Alito offered a plausible argument for declining 
to resolve the highly contentious stream-­of-­commerce issue on which the Court had split 4-­4-­1 in 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), because the issue deserves a full 
briefing in a case that involves modern forms of commerce. See Nicastro, 480 U.S. at 2791 (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
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the answers to the remaining issues?including whether general 
jurisdiction may be established on an agency theory based on the 
contacts of a corporate subsidiary?follow naturally. 
Sherry and Neuborne rightly worry that a Supreme Court 
reversal of the Ninth Circuit in DaimlerChrysler could entrench an 
outdated conception of corporate personhood.10 Sherry argues that 
?setting a high bar for piercing the corporate veil across the board?
including in all jurisdictional contexts?continues and entrenches a 
formalist approach to corporate separateness that does not reflect 
either the reality or the diversity of corporate forms and that allows 
corporations to externalize costs.?11 But the DaimlerChrysler case does 
not require setting a high bar ?across the board?including in all 
jurisdictional contexts,? as Sherry puts it. It simply requires the Court 
to say that general jurisdiction depends upon a corporation?s home 
state, and that a corporation does not establish a home state through 
the contacts of a subsidiary acting as an agent. Contacts through an 
agent may be highly relevant to specific jurisdiction, but they do not 
establish a home state for purposes of general jurisdiction. As long as 
the Court draws a clear distinction between specific jurisdiction and 
general jurisdiction, Sherry?s concern about an across-­the-­board 
standard for imputation of contacts is, I hope, misplaced. 
Neuborne notes that the question to ask is not a metaphysical 
question about where a corporation is ?present,? but rather ?a 
pragmatic question of whether a forum jurisdiction has a legitimate 
regulatory interest in asserting adjudicatory authority over a corporate 
parent who is using a wholly owned-­and-­controlled subsidiary to engage 
in behavior in the forum jurisdiction that justifies regulation of the 
parent.?12 I agree that the state?s regulatory interest is the correct 
inquiry. In presenting this question, however, Neuborne implies that 
the state?s regulatory interest may justify general jurisdiction based on 
the contacts of a subsidiary acting as an agent. Again, I think the 
problem is a failure to account fully for the difference between specific 
and general jurisdiction. In specific jurisdiction cases along the lines of 
Nicastro,13 the best answer to Neuborne?s question will often be yes. 
When a case arises out of the use of a product in a state, the state has 
a regulatory interest in asserting adjudicatory authority over a 
company that purposefully sold the product into the state, even if it did 
so through a subsidiary. In general jurisdiction cases such as 
DaimlerChrysler, however, the answer is no. A state does not have a 
 
 10.  See Sherry, supra note 3, at 116;; Neuborne, supra note 2, at 99?102. 
 11.  Sherry, supra note 3, at 116. 
 12.  Neuborne, supra note 2, at 101. 
 13.  J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
182 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC [Vol. 66:179 
legitimate regulatory interest in asserting adjudicatory authority over 
a foreign company for claims that do not arise out of the company?s 
contacts with the forum state. When Neuborne says that ?[n]othing in 
Nicastro casts doubt on the existence of in personam jurisdiction over a 
foreign automobile manufacturer who uses a wholly owned-­and-­
controlled subsidiary to sell very large numbers of cars in a given 
forum,? he is correct as long as he is referring to specific jurisdiction, 
but not if he is referring to personal jurisdiction over the foreign 
manufacturer for claims unrelated to the company?s business in the 
forum state. 
Assuming the Supreme Court goes forward with addressing 
general jurisdiction in DaimlerChrysler, Professors Childress, Sherry, 
Silberman and I largely agree on a tight test for general jurisdiction, 
but it is worth noting several points of language and emphasis. 
Professor Donald Childress and I agree, I think, on what would 
constitute a sound rule of general jurisdiction and how that rule should 
apply in the DaimlerChrysler case.14 We disagree slightly, however, 
about how the Justices ought to engage the question. Childress 
encourages the Justices to ask a why question: ?the Justices should ask 
the plaintiffs? lawyers why they brought the case in California.?15 He 
lists a number of the reasons why foreign plaintiffs choose to sue in U.S. 
forums, offering a helpful account of transnational forum shopping.16 
But showing that litigants forum shop is not the same as showing that 
it should matter to the Supreme Court in its analysis of the due process 
constraints on judicial power. For purposes of personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant, does it matter why plaintiffs? lawyers chose a particular 
forum? If the district court has power to hear the case (subject matter 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue), and if the court lacks a basis 
for dismissing or transferring as a discretionary matter (forum non 
conveniens, venue transfer), then the court must hear the case 
regardless of what the court thinks of the plaintiffs? motives in choosing 
the forum. And if the court lacks power to hear the case, then the court 
must dismiss regardless of the purity of plaintiffs? motives. While 
transnational forum shopping provides a vivid backdrop to the 
 
 14.  See Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, 
66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is proper only in the corporation??? ?????????? ?????? ??? ????????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????????????? ??????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 15.  Id. at 72. 
 16.  See id. at 73 (noting that foreign plaintiffs may prefer U.S. substantive law, notice 
pleading, liberal discovery, punitive damages, and civil juries). In addition to the items on 
???????????? ?????? ?? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ????? ??? ?????? ????? and the 
availability of class actions as further reasons why foreign plaintiffs sometimes choose United 
States forums. 
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DaimlerChrysler case, plaintiffs? motives have no bearing on whether 
California lacked general jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Professor Sherry invokes the reasonableness prong of personal 
jurisdiction as a potential avenue for resolving the case, though it is not 
her preferred solution: ?Another good option would be to hold that 
regardless of whether DaimlerChrysler has sufficient contacts with 
California, it would be unreasonable for a California court to exercise 
jurisdiction over it.?17 While I agree that jurisdiction over 
DaimlerChrysler would be unreasonable in this case, I would not want 
the Court to go that route. The reasonableness inquiry should have no 
place in general jurisdiction analysis because the very point of general 
jurisdiction is that the relationship between the defendant and the 
forum state gives the state adjudicatory power over the defendant, 
without regard to the particulars of the dispute.18 
Professor Linda Silberman, taking a comparative approach to 
the question of jurisdictional imputation, concludes that imputation of 
contacts on an agency theory ordinarily makes sense only for specific 
jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction.19 I agree not only with her 
conclusion, but also with her reasoning that ?the United States should 
strive for harmonization when the rest of the world has the better 
policy.?20 I have tried to show that the home-­state test makes sense from 
the bottom up, looking at the justification for general jurisdiction 
through the lens of the citizen-­state relationship.21 Silberman shows 
that the home state test, and the rejection of agency-­based imputation 
for general jurisdiction, make sense from the outside in, by looking at 
what is unusual about United States jurisdiction doctrines and asking 
whether those divergences are warranted.22 
My main difference with Professor Silberman is that I embrace 
what she calls the ?rigid dichotomy?23 between general and specific 
jurisdiction. She points to Frummer v. Hilton International24 as a case 
 
 17.  Sherry, supra note 3, at 119. See also Neuborne, supra note 2, at 105 (noting that, 
because of the absence of a regulat???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Asahi ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 18.  Erichson, supra note 7, at 92?93. 
 19.  See Linda J. Silberman, Jurisdictional Imputation in Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler: A 
Bridge Too Far, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC ???????????????????????? ????general jurisdiction cases, 
the contacts of a U.S. subsidiary should be relevant only when the alter ego standard is met. The 
more expansive agency or enterprise theories are most appropriate in cases of specific jurisdiction, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 20.  Id. at 134.  
 21.  Erichson, supra note 7, at 83?85. 
 22.  Silberman, supra note 19;; see also Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????SUP.CT. REV. 591 (2012). 
 23.  Id. at 129. 
 24.  19 N.Y.2d 533 (1967). 
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in which general jurisdiction might be warranted by a subsidiary?s 
forum-­state activity that did not directly give rise to the claim but that 
is ?related closely to the business that gave rise to the claim against the 
parent.?25 This raises a valid point about the interest a forum state may 
have in asserting power over a defendant;; Silberman presents a more 
nuanced account than I offered in my initial piece. A claim may 
implicate a state?s regulatory interest even if the state is neither the 
defendant?s home state nor a place where the claim arose, if the claim 
relates to activity that the defendant conducts in the forum state. But 
the problem is that this sort of interest can be so diffuse that it is 
difficult to see how it offers a workable test for the assertion of power. 
It is true that cases such as Frummer, unlike DaimlerChrysler, may 
present plausible connections among the defendant, the claim, and the 
forum state. But such connections beyond the defendant?s home state 
should not provide an adequate basis for general jurisdiction after 
Goodyear. To the extent a court?s assertion of power hinges on the 
relatedness of the claim to the forum, the argument ought to depend 
more on the logic of specific jurisdiction than general jurisdiction, 
although admittedly it has aspects of both. In the end, I agree with 
Professor Silberman?s comment that, despite the appeal of a nuanced 
functional approach, ?such line-­drawing in the category of general 
jurisdiction cases may be so difficult that one is moved to constrain 
imputation on an agency theory to cases of specific jurisdiction.?26 
 
 
 25.  Silberman, supra note 19, at 129. 
 26.  Id. at 132. 
